Some in the security community think of the Maginot Line as a failure in defense as German troops went around it. This kind of arrogance is, unfortunetely, all too common, especially among security bullies. The following video argues that the Maginot line was a success, because it forced the German troops to go around it:
Ihr meckert, aber für Eisenbahner ist der Winter ein Kampf ums nackte Leben:
Slavoj Žižek does not care about surveillance:
Pessimisten denken angesichts des technischen Fortschritts zuerst an Schwärme autonomer Killerdrohnen, Optimisten lieber an Retterdrohnen, die in Notsituationen zum Beispiel Schwimmhilfen abwerfen:
Unabhängig davon wette ich gegen jeden vorausgesagten Weltuntergang, schon aus statistischen und spieltheoretischen Gründen. Weltuntergänge kommen statistisch sehr selten vor und falls doch mal einer eintritt, bleibt trotz korrekter Vorhersage der Wettgewinn aus.
There was a time when personal computers came with security built into their hardware. For about a decade from 1984 on, virtually every PC featured a key lock. Depending on the particular implementation, locking would prevent powering on the computer, keyboard input, hard drive access, opening the case, or a combination thereof. This video tells the story:
From today’s perspective the key lock looks like a weak if not pointless security mechanism. In the best case it makes tampering with the hardware slightly harder—attackers have to equip themselves with tools and spend some time using them—while not at all addressing all the software vulnerabilities that we care about so much today.
Nevertheless the design made a lot of sense.
First, a keylock is a usable security mechanism. Everyone is familiar with key locks and knows how to use them, no complicated setup is required, and there is little potential for mistakes.
Second, an attacker’s physical access to hardware internals defeats most software security mechanisms. Physical access control is therefore a prerequisite for security against certain threats.
Third, personal computers at that time were not really threatened by online or software attacks, perhaps with the exception of relatively harmless viruses spreading through exchanged floppy disks. Someone tampering with the computer was indeed one of the more realistic threats.
Fourth, seemingly minor security gains can be rather effective when put in context. While forcing attackers to carry tools and use them may not seem like a great complication for them, it may suffice to prevent opportunistic attacks as well as quick serial attacks against multiple consecutive targets.
Security technology has evolved to make key locks obsolete, but they made sense at the time of their introduction.
Die ARD-Doku „Die Angst-Industrie – Warum wir Risiken maßlos überschätzen“ ist schon etwas älter, aber weiter aktuell:
Werbefilm mit Titten:
The following videos teaches us the 7 signs of terrorism:
- Tests of security
- Acquiring supplies
- Suspicious people who “don’t belong”
- Dry runs or trial runs
- Deploying assets or getting into position
Now watch out for terrorists.